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NOTES
HEARSAY EVIDENCE: INCULPATORY DECLARATIONS AGAINST PENAL
INTEREST AND FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 804(b)(3)-United States

v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981).
INTRODUCTION

Hearsay' statements have traditionally been regarded as inadmissible evidence 2 because of their unreliability. 3 Exceptions have
developed,4 however, which allow particular hearsay declarations to be
admitted in evidence provided they possess sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness.
Declarations against interest are one such exception. This exception, which originated in the early 1800's,6 formerly encompassed
1. Hearsay is defined in FED. R. EVID. 801(c) as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted." See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972) (hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; 5 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1361 (rev. ed. J. CHADBOURN 1974) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]. For a comprehensive examination of the definition of hearsay under the
Federal Rules of Evidence see Symposium-Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal
Rules: A DiscretionaryApproach, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1086-101 (1969).
2. For an extensive review of the development of the hearsay rule see WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 1364.
3. Generally, hearsay statements are viewed as unreliable because the out-ofcourt declarant making the assertions is not under oath, the demeanor of the declarant
cannot be observed by the trier of fact, and the declarant cannot be subjected to crossexamination. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 245; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN800[01] [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]; WIGMORE, supra note 1,
STEIN'S EVIDENCE
§ 1362. The above stated reasons have also been noted in case law. E.g., Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273
(1913). For other, less acdepted theories see WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1363 (risk of incorrect transmission, hearsay is intrinsically weak, hearsay is merely an anonymous
statement or rumor).
4. See generally note 2 supra.
5. Wigmore describes this requirement as the "circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness." WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1420 at 251. The realiability of the statement is usually ascertained through the statement's content or by an examination of
the context in which it was made. Comment, FederalRule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and
Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1189 (1978). The
need to facilitate proof of material facts has also been recognized as a factor contributing to the development of hearsay exceptions. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§
1420-21.
6. For a complete history of the development of the against-interest exception
see WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1476.
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statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest, but not
statements against penal interest.' A lack of sound reasoning for this
materialistic restriction' provided the motivation for a painfully slow
trend toward sanctioning the use of extrajudicial statements against
penal interest in American courts.9
Promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 enhanced
this movement.'" Rule 804(b)(3) codifies the against-interest exception
including within its defintion those hearsay declarations which are
adverse to the declarant's penal interest.II Although it enlarges the
scope of the against-interest exception, rule 804(b)(3) fails to provide
7. This distinction originated in 1844 with the Sussex Peerge Case, 8 Eng. Rep.
1034 (1844). In this case the House of Lords, ignoring precedent, determined a statement which subjected the declarant to criminal liability was not encompassed within
the against-interest rule. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 278; WIGMORE, supra note 1, §
1476.
In the United States, most courts blindly followed the distinction developed in the
Sussex Peerage Case. E.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Siple v.
State, 154 Ind. 647, 57 N.E. 544 (1900).
8. Several justifications have been forwarded for this distinction. Brennan v.
State, 151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148 (1926) (fear that defendants would be tempted to introduce perjured testimony); State v. Fletcher, 24 Or. 295, 33 P. 575 (1893) (admissibility may lead to investigation of collateral matters and divert the jury from the
real issue involved); Tom Love Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 166 Tenn. 275, 61 S.W.2d
672 (1933) (declaration, if true, would render the declarant morally incompetent to
testify). Courts and commentators have, however, generally condemned the arbitrary
limitation placed upon the use of against-penal-interest hearsay. E.g., Donnery v.
United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913) (Holmes, J. dissenting); WIGMORE, supra note
1, § 1477; Morgan, Declarations Against Interest, 5 VAND. L. REV. 451, 463 (1952).
Many courts, rather than oppose this distinction, have displayed amazing ingenuity in
discovering an acceptable against-interest element. See, e.g., Weber v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ry. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915) (criminal conviction exposes
declarant to civil liability); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strauch, 179 Okla. 617, 67 P.2d 452
(1937) (confession of murder cancels declarant's right to collect life insurance pro-

ceeds), overruled on other grounds, Howard v. Jessup, 519 P.2d 913 (Okla. 1973).
9. See Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945); See also MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 278.

10.
11.

28 U.S.C. (1975).
FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) provides:

(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement againstinterest. A statement which was at the time of its making so
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended
to subject him to criminal or civil liability, or to render invalid a claim by him
against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the

statement.
For an extensive examination of the legislative history of rule 804(b)(3) see notes
36-44 and accompanying text infra.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/7
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courts with any guidance when they are confronted with a particularly
troublesome type of declaration against interest: the inculpatory statement against the penal interest of the declarant.' 2 This ambiguity
created a vacuum which, until the decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Sarmiento-Perez,13
the federal courts had failed to adequately address."
This note will focus upon the holding and implications of the
Sarmiento-Perez decision. Toward that goal, special attention will be
given to the attempt by the Sarmiento-Perez court to balance the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment" and the admission of inculpatory hearsay declarations.
FACTS OF THE CASE

Luis Oscar Sarmiento-Perez was indicted, along with threecoconspirators, for allegedly participating in a narcotics (cocaine)
transaction with two undercover Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.)
Agents.' 6 At Sarmiento-Perez's trial the prosecution was permitted to
introduce in evidence the custodial, handwritten confession of a
nontestifying, separately-tried codefendant named Roberto Aguilar. 7
12. Inculpatory statements are declarations which implicate both the declarant
and the defendant in criminal activity and which are admitted in evidence against the
latter. Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements
Against Penal Interest, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1189, 1190 n.7 (1978). Exculpatory
statements are declarations against the declarant's interest which tend to exonerate the
defendant. Id.
13. 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981).
14. Several lower federal courts confronted with the question of the admissibility
of inculpatory extrajudicial declarations under rule 804(b)(3) have been evasive or
unclear. E.g., United States v. White, 553 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
972 (1977) (court concluded it did not have to reach the issue of admissibility because
the admission of the statement was harmless error "if error at all ... ." Id. at 314.);
United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978) (court assumed without adequate justification that inculpatory statements were included within the scope of rule
804(b)(3)). A few federal courts have, however, directly addressed the inculpatory
hearsay problem but their conclusions were always dictum. United States v. Barrett,
539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976) (the court, considering the admissibility of an exculpatory
declaration, traced the history of rule 804(b)(3) and concluded "subject to sixth
amendment and other constraints, a third party's out of court statement against penal
interest may now be used against ... an accused." Id. at 250.)
15. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part, "in
to be confronted with
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .
the witnesses against him. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1096 (5th Cir. 1981).
17. Id. at 1097. It is interesting to note that Aguilar's confession was the only
direct evidence connecting Sarmiento-Perez to the crime. Id. at 1104. The only other
incriminating evidence offered at trial was the observations of D.E.A. surveillance
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Aguilar's confession outlined Sarmiento-Perez's involvement in the
narcotics transaction and identified him as the source of the cocaine."
Sarmiento-Perez was ultimately convicted on one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute, and two counts of distributing,
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(A)(1).' 9 On appeal,
Sarmiento-Perez challenged the admission into evidence of Aguilar's
confession under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the confron20
tation clause of the sixth amendment.

The government countered by arguing the confession was admissible as a declaration against Aguilar's penal interest under Federal Rule

of Evidence 804(b)(3); 2 ' consequently, its admission would neither offend the defendant's confrontation rights nor violate the hearsay rule.
In addition, the government argued that even if the admission of the
confession was error, the error was harmless. 2
DECISION OF THE COURT

After an exhaustive review of the legislative history of rule
804(b)(3), the Sarmiento-Perez court concluded that although the rule
does not provide specific references to inculpatory extrajudicial
declarations, their admission, under appropriate circumstances, was
clearly contemplated by the rule.2 3

Citing an earlier fifth circuit decision, United States v. Alvarez, 2

as controlling authority, the Sarmiento-Perez court concluded the

general corroboration requirement which rule 804(b)(3) explicitly imposes upon exculpatory statements 25 must also be satisfied for in-

agents who reportedly saw Sarmiento-Perez associating with other codefendants and
driving a car from whose trunk the codefendants had retrieved a box later found to
contain cocaine. No evidence existed, other than Aguilar's confession, to prove
Sarmiento-Perez placed the box in the trunk or knew of its contents. Id. at 1097.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1096.
20. Id. at 1097.
21. The court noted Aguilar's confession was not admissible as a coconspirator's
statement because the confession was made after the conspiracy had been terminated
by the arrests and, therefore, it did not qualify as a nonhearsay coconspirator's statement as defined in FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Id. at n.3.
22. Id. at 1098.
23. Id. For a comprehensive review of the legislative history of rule 804(b)(3) see
notes 36-44 and accompanying text infra.
24. 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
25. Rule 804(b)(3) states in part; "A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corrobrating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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culpatory statements.26 This determination prompted the SarmientoPerez court to adopt a general test, first delineated in Alvarez, for
determining the admissibility of inculpatory hearsay under rule
804(b)(3). The test consists of three parts:
The declarant must be unavailable;
the statement must so far tend to subject the declarant to
criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true; and
(3) the statement must be corrobrated by circumstances clearly
indicating its trustworthiness."
Although the three elements of the test correspond identically with
the prerequisites for the admission of exculpatory hearsay set forth by
rule 804(b)(3), the Sarmiento-Perezcourt was emphatic that the admission of inculpatory hearsay presented special confrontation problems
which would necessarily affect the test's method of application.2"
The court reasoned that because the admission of an inculpatory
extrajudicial statement so impacts the confrontational rights of the accused, the United States Supreme Court decision in Chambers v.
Mississippi29 demanded the admission must be subjected to a "close
examination" that is not required of exculpatory declarations.30 As a
consequence of this determination the Sarmiento-Perezcourt concluded an expansive interpretation of the against-interest requirement of
v. Thomas,3 was inrule 804(b)(3), as demonstrated in United States
32
appropriate for use with inculpatory hearsay.
(1)
(2)

26.
1978)).
27.
28.
29.

633 F.2d at 1098 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir.
633 F.2d at 1098.
Id.
410 U.S. 284 (1973).

30. The Chambers Court emphasized the right of confrontation, noting that it
helps assure the "accuracy of the truth-determining process." Id. at 295 (citing Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)). The Chambers Court also noted that the right to

confront is not absolute but "its denial or significant diminution calls into question the
ultimate 'integrity of the fact-finding process' and requires that the competing interest
be closely examined." Id. (citing Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (emphasis added)).
31. 571 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1978). In Thomas, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit determined an extrajudicial statement having probative value in a
trial against the declarant would satisfy the requirement of rule 804(b)(3) which
demands that the statement 'tend' to subject the declarant to criminal liability. Id. at
288. The Sarmiento-Perez court termed this an "expansive interpretation of the
against-interest requirement ...

32.

633 F.2d at 1101.
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This conclusion ultimately led the court to hold Aguilar's custodial

confession, although self-incriminating, was not sufficiently contrary
to his penal interest to be an admission under rule 804(b)(3)." The
court also held the confession had carried "critical weight '"3 ' in the
35
trial court and thus its admission was reversible error.
ANALYSIS

The original Advisory Committee3 6 draft of rule 804(b)(3) explicit-

ly barred the admission of inculpatory extrajudicial statements. The
final sentence of the proposed rule stated: "This example does not in-

clude a statement or confession offered against the accused in a
criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both
himself and the accused."

3

Although this sentence was retained in the

1971 Advisory Committee draft,38 it was ultimately omitted in both the
final unpublished draft forwarded to the United States Supreme

Court39 and in the official Advisory Committee draft promulgated by
the Court in late 1972.0 The House of Representatives reinserted the
33. Id. at 1102. For an examination of the rationale behind the court's determination see note 69 infra.
34. The term "critical weight" was used in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1964), to denote the amount of persuasion a particular event or piece of evidence carried with the finder of the fact. In Douglas, the Court determined that because the error in question added critical weight to the prosecution's case the defendant's conviction had to be reversed. Id. at 420.
35. 633 F.2d at 1104.
36. In March 1965, Chief Justice Warren commissioned the Advisory Committee
and a Reporter for the committee to draft rules of evidence for use in the federal
courts. The first draft completed by the committee was published in 1969. Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 40-41 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings] (statement of Judge Albert B. Maris). For a most thorough examination of the drafting processes of rule 804(b)(3) see Tague, Perilsof the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804
(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L. J. 851 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Perils
of the Rulemaking Process].
37. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4) (1969 Draft), 46 F.R.D. 161, 378 (1969).
Before the rule became law it was renumbered as 804(b)(3).
The sentence quoted above is often referred to as the "Bruton sentence" because
the restrictive qualification was added by Professor Edward L. Cleary, the Reporter to
the Advisory Committee, to ensure rule 804(b)(3) would not clash with his interpretation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 (1965). Perilsof the Rulemaking Process,supra note 36, at 866 n.52 (citation
omitted).
38. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4) (1971 Draft), 51 F.R.D. 315, 438-39 (1971).
39. Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements
Against PenalInterest, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1189, 1191 (1978).
40. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (1972 Draft), 56 F.R.D. 183, 321 (1972). The
sentence's deletion was explained by the Advisory Committee in the official draft:
Ordinarily the third-party confession is though [sic] of in terms of exculpating the
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sentence when the Federal Rules of Evidence were submitted for Congressional amendment and approval. 4 ' The Senate Judiciary Committee decided, however, to delete the sentence from its own version of
the rules42 and the joint conference committee subsequently agreed to
eliminate the sentence. 3 Consequently, the final version of rule
804(b)(3), as passed by Congress, contained no specific references to
inculpatory hearsay."

Although at least one distinguished commentator had determined
the rule's legislative history conclusively demonstrated a legislative intent to exclude inculpatory statements, ' 5 the Sarmiento-Perez court,
without stating adequate justification, paralleled its previous decision
accused, but this is by no means always or necessarily the case: it may include
statements implicating him, and under the general theory of declarations against
interest they would be admissible as related statements. Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 . . .and Bruton v. United States, 389 U.S. 818 [sic] ... both involved
confessions by codefendants which implicated the accused. While the confession
was not actually offered in evidence in Douglas, the procedure followed effectively put it before the jury, which the Court ruled to be error. Whether the confession might have been admissible as a declaration against penal interest was not
considered or discussed. Bruton assumed inadmissibility, as against the accused,
of the implicating confession of his codefendant. . . .These decisions, however,
by no means require all statements implicating another person be excluded from
the category of declarations against interest.
Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(4) (1972 Draft), 56
F.R.D. 183. 327-28 (1972).
41. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973). See also Senate Hearings, supra
note 36, at 6 (statement of William L. Hungate); Perils of the Rulemaking Process,
supra note 37, at 854 n.10.
42. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON FEDERAL RULES of EVIDENCE,
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEWS 7051, 7068.
43. COMM. OF CONFERENCE, REPORT ON FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R.
REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7098, 7106. The stated reason for the deletion was: "to avoid attempting to
codify constitutional evidentiary principles." Id.
44. See note 12 supra.
804(b)(3)[03]. Weinstein, after noting that the
45. WEINSTEIN, supra note 3,
first two drafts of rule 804(b)(3) explicitly barred the admission of inculpatory declarations, concluded:
Except in the most unusual situation, [exclusion of the statement] ... would have
been the result obtained under the present rule. When the House Judiciary Committee reinstated the final sentence of the first two drafts . . . it made this point
clear. But the addition was dropped by-the Senate and acceeded [sic] to by the
House on the ground that it was not needed.... In context, this means that the
Rule should be interepreted to include this language.
Id. at 804-110. Weinstein's conclusion has been critized on the ground that his analysis
was based upon the confrontation clause and rule 403 and not upon the ambiguity of
rule 804(b)(3). Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory
Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1189, 1191 n.18 (1978).
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in United States v. Alvarez"' by concluding "the rule clearly contemplates the admission, under appropriate circumstances, of ... inculpatory (to a criminally accused) statements against the declarant's
penal interest."' The court also stated, again without supportive
reasoning, "[t]he draftsman of the rule 'left to the courts the task of
delineating prerequisites to the admissibility of inculpatory againstpenal-interest hearsay.'""4
Reiterating its decision in Alvarez, the Sarmiento-Perez court set
forth a three-part test 9 for admission of inculpatory declarations. The
test's prerequisites for admission are identical to those outlined by rule
804(b)(3) for the admission of exculpatory hearsay declarations against
interest." The Sarmiento-Perez court tried to distinguish the two standards by stating, somewhat unconvincingly, that in the Alvarez decision it had never intended that the two tests be applied identically nor
had the Alvarez court purported to establish the maximum limits the
confrontation clause might place upon the admissibility of inculpatory
extrajudicial statements."
The Sarmiento-Perez court's attempted clarification of its position
in Alvarez is less than convincing because the unambiguous language
used by the court in Alvarez left it unsusceptible to multiple interpretations. Referring to its determination that an inculpatory declaration is
admissible if corroborating circumstances exist which clearly indicate
its trustworthiness, the Alvarez court stated "[w]e believe that this
construction fully corresponds to the Court's directive in Dutton v.
Evans and will thus avoid the constitutional [confrontation clause] difficulties that Congress acknowledged but deferred to judicial resolution." 52 The Alvarez court further stated, "by transplanting the
language governing exculpatory statements onto the analysis for ad-

46. 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
47. 633 F.2d at 1098.
48. Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 700).
49. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
50. Rule 804(b)(3) requires that the declarant be unavailable, the statement be sufficiently against the declarant's interest that a reasonable man would not make it unless
he believed it to be true and, as a special requirement for exculpatory statements, that
there be corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the statement's trustworthiness.
See note 11 supra for a formal recitation of rule 804(b)(3).
Comparing the requirements for the admissibility of exculpatory declarations under
804(b)(3) with the three-part test delineated by the court in Alvarez it becomes apparent that the Alvarez test is nothing more than a mirror image of the requirement of
rule 804(b)(3) for the admission of exculpatory declarations.
51. 633 F.2d at 1098.
52. 584 F.2d at 701.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/7
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mitting inculpatory hearsay, a unitary standard is derived which offers

the most workable basis for applying Rule 804(b)(3)."" The SarmientoPerez court's position that the Alvarez decision was not intended to
establish a unitary standard for determining the admissibility of
against-interest hearsay is further undermined by the Alvarez court's

reliance on case law concerning exculpatory statements to determine
the admissibility of the inculpatory declaration then before it. '
This "clarification"

of Alvarez was essential, however, to the

Sarmiento-Perez court's overall analysis of rule 804(b)(3) because it
freed the court to conduct an in-depth examination of the interaction
between the confrontation clause and inculpatory hearsay
statements." The court began by expressly recognizing that although

the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment forms the defendant's
foremost protection against the use or misuse of incriminating hearsay
declarations, 56 the defendant's confrontation rights,'I as formulated by

the United States Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States58 and
Douglas v. Alabama," are not absolute if certain "indicia of reliability" are present.6"

53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. The Alvarez court, noting that it created a unitary standard for determining
the admissibility of both inculpatory and exculpatory statements under rule 804(b)(3),
stated: "Therefore, in our analysis [of] the trustworthiness of Lopez' inculpatory hearsay, we look to decisions considering exculpatory statements." Id. n.9. For a review of
the case law the Alvarez court relied on see 584 F.2d at 699-702.
55. The admission of inculpatory hearsay necessarily invokes questions concerning the confrontation rights of the accused because the admission of incriminating extrajudicial statements circumvents the defendant's constitutional right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . .

."

U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For discussion

of the relationship between the admission of inculpatory hearsay and the confrontation
clause see WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, 804(b)(3)[031 at 804-109; United States v.
Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1100 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. 633 F.2d at 1099 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 700).
57. See note 15 supra.
58. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Bruton Court held the admission of incriminating
hearsay (custodial confession) violated the petitioner's right of cross-examination as
secured by the confrontation clause. Although the Bruton holding seems to eliminate
any argument for admitting inculpatory hearsay, in fact it does not because the Bruton
Court explicitly noted: "There is not before us . . . any recognized exception to the
hearsay rule . . . and [therefore] we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions

necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 128 n.3.
59. 380 U.S. 415 (1965). The Douglas Court reversed the defendant's conviction
because a custodial confession of a separately-tried codefendant, directly incriminating
the defendant, was admitted into evidence under the pretense of cross-examination.
The Court reasoned that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment prevented
the admission of evidence whose reliability could only be insured by an unobtainable
cross-examination of the declarant. Id. at 419-20.
60. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The Dutton Court held the admission of
inculpatory hearsay, under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule (it was a state
Published by eCommons, 1981
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Realizing, probably correctly, that the reliability requirement of

the confrontation clause presents a more demanding standard than the
reliability requirement associated with the Alvarez test,"' the
Sarmiento-Perez court focused its attention on delineating the
threshold of admissibility of inculpatory statements as defined by the

confrontation clause.2 The court consequently determined," [w]hen
inculpatory hearsay is sought to be admitted into evidence under the
aegis of a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, the right to confront . . . is being asked to yield to another legitimate interest in the

criminal trial process ....

'63

Thus the competing interest to which the

right to confront yields must be, under Chambers v. Mississippi" and
Ohio v. Roberts," "closely examined."

As a result of its comprehensive analysis, the Sarmiento-Perez
court established a new and distinct test for determining the admissibility of inculpatory hearsay under rule 804(b)(3). This test involves an application of the three-part Alvarez test in light of the

"close examination" called for in Chambers and Roberts. In the
Sarmiento-Perez court's application of the new tist it assumed,
without discussion, that the hearsay evidence sought to be admitted

met the criteria of parts (1) and (3) of the Alvarez test.6 6 The Court
therefore focused on the second element of the test: "The statement

must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a
reasonable person in his position would not have made the statement
' 67
unless he believed it to be true."
This against-interest requirement had previously been interpreted
by the fifth circuit as encompassing disserving statements that would

hearsay exception), did not necessarily violate the confrontation rights of the accused
if certain indicia of reliability were present. The Dutton Court carefully distinguished
the facts before it from those in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). It stated
that the evidence involved was not crucial or devastating nor was a custodial confession involved as in Douglas. 400 U.S. at 87. As the Sarmiento-Perez court pointed out,
the distinguishing language in Dutton implies that custodial confessions are not within
the purview of statements that Dutton would admit. 633 F.2d at 1104.
61. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
62. 633 F.2d at 1099. The court stated: [w]here the confrontation clause is implicated, it will tend inevitably to place the threshold of admissibility under the applicable hearsay exception at a level that will pass constitutional muster." Id. at 1100.
See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81-82 (1970).
63. 633 F.2d at 1100. The other interest the court is referring to is the interest in
affording the trier of fact "the opportunity to consider all relevant testimony that is
sufficiently trustworthy." Id.
64. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). For a brief discussion of the Chambers opinion see notes
29 and 30 and accompanying text supra.
65. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
66. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
67. Id.
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have probative value in a trial against the declarant. 6 1 Mindful of the
close examination requirement, however, the Sarmiento-Perez court
ruled that because of the readily perceived advantages of implicating
another in the same crime as the defendant himself is implicated 9 the
definition was not suitable for determining the admissibility of inculpatory hearsay. 7"
Except for a reference to two sources which discuss the issue, 7 ' the
Sarmiento-Perezcourt declined to elaborate on what it considered sufficient to pass a close examination of the against-interest requirement.
Although this treatment of the issue tends to leave lower courts
without satisfactory guidance, the Sarmiento-Perez court was perhaps
merely being careful not to decide issues that were not properly before
it.
In the Sarmiento-Perez court's actual application of its newly formulated test it determined, without difficulty, that Aguilar's custodial
confession, implicating Sarmiento-Perez, was not sufficiently contrary
to Aguilar's penal interest to satisfy rule 804(b)(3). 7 2 The court arrived
at this conclusion after closely examining the facts and circumstances
surrounding Aguilar's confession. It determined a reasonable person in
Aguilar's position might well have been motivated to misrepresent the
role of others in the crime in which he himself was implicated in order
to "curry favor with the authorities." 73 The court supported its conclusion with a brief review of several Supreme Court opinions which
note the inherent unreliability of custodial confessions which implicate
others.7 4 It is important to note, however, that the aggregate of these
opinions by the Court indicates that custodial confessions which implicate another in the same crime as that in which the accused himself
is implicated are too fraught with elements of unreliability to be ad68. United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1978).
69. The Sarmiento-Perez court noted: "[T]he very natural desire to curry favor
from the arresting officers, the desire to alleviate culpability by implicating others, the
enmity often generated in a conspiracy gone awry, the desire for revenge, all might
lead an arrestee-declarant to misrepresent or to exaggerate the role of others in the
criminal enterprise. 633 F.2d at 1102.
70. Id. at 1101-02.
71. The court referred to WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, 804(b)(3)[02], at 804-97
through -101 and to Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory
Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1189, 1214-15 (1978).
72.

633 F.2d at 1102.

73. Id. The court felt that a reasonable man may have viewed the statement to be
in his interest rather than against it. Id. For a discussion of the court's rational see note
69 supra.
74. Id. at 1102-04. The court discussed three cases at length. Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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missible under any but the most exceptional circumstances. From this
viewpoint it appears that the Sarmiento-Perezcourt's final decision to
exclude Aguilar's custodial confession was dictated long before it
undertook its probing examination of rule 804(b)(3). Although the
Sarmiento-Perez court's thorough opinion and newly formulated test
will be invaluable to future courts when passing on the inculpatory
hearsay issue, it appears that the court improperly decided issues and
formulated tests that were not required to decide issues actually before
it. The court was careful, however, not to pass upon the related issue of
whether the admission of Aguilar's custodial confession would have
offended the confrontation rights of Sarmiento-Perez.
CONCLUSION

The fifth circuit's decision in Sarmiento-Perezwas a great step forward from its decision in Alvarez. In Sarmiento-Perez, unlike Alvarez,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals meticulously outlined the reasoning
involved in permitting, under appropriate circumstances, the admission of inculpatory hearsay under rule 804(b)(3).
The Sarmiento-Perez decision is also noteworthy for its careful
analysis of the conflict between the confrontation clause and the admission of inculpatory hearsay. Although the Sarmiento-Perez court
declined to pass upon the issue whether the Alvarez test, coupled with
the close examination requirement of Chambers and Roberts, would
sufficiently guarantee trustworthiness, and thus circumvent confrontational problems, the mere undertaking of the analysis should greatly
benefit future courts faced with similar fact patterns.
Michael T. Blee
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